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OHA.PTER I

Bases of Relativism in MOral Action
l

In the pragmatism

2
of \'lilliam James there are two primary dicta

which serve as the bases of his attacks on the universality of the
moral law.
n

1

The first dictum combines two points of relativism:

The true•, to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in

the way of our thinking, just as

1

the right 1 is only the expedient

in the way of our behaving."; The second dictum is: "The essence of
good is simply to satisfy a demand ••• "4
1 This term was first used in our times by Oharles Sanders Peirce,
in an article in the Popular Science Monthly, for January,l878.
2 In Chapter III of this thesis, the potential meaning for moral
values becomes actual, as the long discussion on the pragmatic
nature of truth an~ good is used as a cornerstone for the development of relative morality.
; James, William, Pragmatism, New York:Longmans,Green, l$X>7 222
4 James, William, The i'lill to Believe and Other Essays in Popular
Philosophy, New York: Longmans, Green ,1899 201
The complete quotation is from the chapter entitled, "The Moral
Philosopher and the Moral Life;" the context follows:
11
The essence of good is simply to satisfy a demand. The demand
may be for anything under the sun. There is really no ground
for supposing that all our demands can be accounted for by
one univt:trsal underlying kind o:!" motive than there is gro'tD'ld
for supposing that all physical ~nomena are oases of a single
law. The elementary forces in :e1Jftics are probably as plural as
those in physics are. •

-

2

-

Let us examlne what is meant in the first dictum by the word,
"true."

It would appear that the whole doctrine of pragmatism as

utilitarian individualism hangs upon the pragmatist account of truth.
The first sentence of the first page of the preface to The

5

of Truth, begins:

11

~reantng

The pivotal pa.rt of my book named Pragmatism is

its account of the relation called

1

truth 1 • • • "

6

Once the meaning

of pragmatic truth is really clear, the other values may be related
to it.

It would first of all pragmatic elements be the most necessarily

important, as nothing else in pragn:atism could be explained without
first making a study of the relative truth.

This truth, for James, is

apparently a constantly changing relation bet,feen mind and reality,
and on that basis, it is relativistic.

5
6

New York:Longmans, Green, 1909 Preface 1
The context here is taken from the rest of the sentence, and
from some further quotations from the Preface:
"The . pivotal part of my book called Pragma:tism is its account
of the relation called 1 truth 1 , which may obtain betvreen an
idea (opinion, belief, statement, or what-not) and its object.
1
Truth 1 I there say, 'is a property of certain of our ideas.
It means their agreement, as falsity means their disagreement,
with reality • • • •
Preface xiv: 11 The pragmatist view • • • of the truth relation
is that it has a definite content and that everything in it is
experiencible."
From Pragmatism, 226: "Experience is in mutation". Here the
context describes the quarrel between the pragmatist and his demand
for absolute a posteriorism, and the rationalist a priorism, which,
according the James, is an incorrect pre-disposition to see things
in reality which are not truly there.

-~ "Previous truth;fresh facts: -and our mind finds a new truth.n7
Truth and experience are cumulative:"So far. as reality means experiencible reality, both it and the truth men gain about it are
8
everlastingly in the process of mutation ••• n and, "truth is made
largely out of
process of

~revious

disco~ry.•tike

will have to

be~

9

.

truths." There is no end to this cumulative
the half-truths, the absolute truth

as a relation incidental to the growth of a

James, ~lilliam, Pragmatism, 241
The full context is given in the sentence just preceding the
remark cited: "·Truth grafts itself on previous truth, modifying
it in the process, just as idiom grafts itself on idiom, and
law on previous law • • • "
8 Ibid. 224-~5
9 Ibid. 224
The quotations have been transposed from the original order for
the purpose of bringing clarity. The context is from the chapter,
"The Notion of Truth,"and the matter under discussion there
holds out the premiss that all beliefs are things dra\~ entirely
from experience. "Men's beliefs at any time:are so much experience fUnded."
.
On page 225:
11
In the realm of truth processes, facts come independently
and determine our beliefs provisionally. But these beliefs
make us act, and as fast as they do eo, they bring into eight
or into existence new facts which re~determine the beliefs
accordingly. So the whole coil and ball of truth, as it rolls
· up, ie the product of a double influence. Truths emerge from
facts; they dip forward into facts again and add to them; which
facts again create or reveal new truths (the word is indifferent)
and so on indefinitely. n

7

- 4 mass of verification experience to which the half-true ideas
are all along contributing their quota." 10 The context from which
this quotation was taken insists that any idea of an absolute truth
beyond the influence of conctete reality and its changing demands
11

is an unreal thing in itself.

11

No further experience will ever alter"

the absolute truth, "an ideal vanishing-point towards which we imagine
our temporary truths will some day converge. It runs on all fours
with the perfectly wise man and the absolutely complete experience;
12

and if these ideals are ever realized, they will be realized together."
10
11
12

Pragmatism, 224
Ibid. 222

12!!·

22,

Also, from The Mean~ of Truth, in the chapter entitled
"Humanism and Truth, p. 72, the following is taken:
"The only truth that he himself ~he rationalis~ will ever
accept will be that to which his finite experienceslead him
of themselves. The state of mind that shudders at the idea of
a lot of experiences left to themselves and that augura proteo~ion from the sheer name of' an absolute, as if, however
imperative, that might stand for a sort of' ghostly security,
is li~e the mood of those good people who, whenever they hear
of a social tendency that is damnable ••• say, "Parliament
or Congress, ought to make a law against it, 11 as if an impotent decree would give relief."

- 5 There is a further note of complaint in the chapter entitled
"The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life", where James says:
" They

~e rationalist;J imagine an abstract moral order in

1 a
which the objective truth reeides." '

The several questions begin to take shape from the root consideration
of the relative truth. Unity always suggested the dread Absolute,
b
to James1' and hie insistence upon the flux of life took him into
a demand for a truth that changed from moment to moment, even as
1 ife changed.
1~

l'b

Will to Believe, 194
In the same context, the article, "The Pragmatism of William
James," by John F. McCormick, in Modern Schoolman,Vol.XX,No.l,
remarks on this aversion of James for any absolute as always
meaning something dead, outside of life. In the same magazine,
0
A Summary of Bergsonism" by Stewart E. Dollard, quotes the
attitude of Bergson, who was a sympathetic acquaintance of
James, and often echoed hie words, as holding that "science
analyzes life by killing it." We might also say that James
argued that an absolute truth took the life away from relative
truth.

-

6 -

The first question we ask in dealing with the relative truth,
is this one: Is there a norm for the relative truth?

The answer

seems to be in the use of the word"expediency" as it appears in the

14

dictum and in the insistence upon experience and concreteness
of whatever truth is attained.

"All the sanctions of the law of

truth lie in the very texture of experience. Absolute or no absolute,
the concrete truth for us, will always be that way of thinking in
which our various experiences most profitably combine."

14

15

Page 1 of Thesis.
Meaning of Truth,

15

7~

Also from Jragmatimn, 2~2: (Inter-relation of Truth,Expediency)
11
It is quite evident that our obligation to ackncndedge
truth, so far from being unconditional, is tre~endouely conditioned. Truth with a big T, and in the singular, claims
abstractly to be recognized, of course; but the concrete truth
in the plural need be recognized only when the recognition is
expedient. A truth must always be preferred to a falsehood
when both relate to the same situation; but when neither does,
truth is of as little duty as falsehood."

- 7 Expediency as an attribute of truth would demand that the truth
be temporary and provisional.

Since experience is such a quick-

sand of change, as an anchor for truth it cannot be anything but
a reference, not a real norm alone.

What is expedient must also

be verified; there is a one-aided relation to experience made by
plunging into activity each-time we want to be certain of an idea.
"True ideas are those which we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. False ideas are those which we cannot." 16
It would seem that what is true can be verified, and what is verified is expedient. The final reference for any idea or its truth
is its usefulness, its "cash value• in terms of experience. 17
16 Pragmatism, 201 The context considers what practical difference
.it makes in our lives to have a true idea of something; this
is so necessary to us that life or death depend on it.
Again, Father l.fcCormick (Footnote 1;b) makes the remark that
James never asks more of a thing than what it does. He would
never have asked, "~Vhat is itT• as an essence meant something
statio to him.
17 The past value of an experience is invalid when we consider
that experiences cannot be substituted for each other.
See p.lO of Thesis and p.;o.

-

8 -

Since the OO.t1orete truth means only the way in which our various
experiences are considered to have been profitable, the note of
profit, of expediency in the pragmatic sense, is the essence of
truth.

The attributes of this truth are to be changing, pro-

visional, temporary and utilitarian, or expedient in the pragmatic
definition.

All these notes are properties of the primary dicta

of pragmatism; they are being sounded constantly through the entire
writings of the American Pragmatist, William James; they are needed
to explain the dictum on truth as being that which is expedient
18
in the way of thinktng and the good that exists merely to satisfy
a demand.
In a context dealing with same attacks on the relative truth,

James says: "It the truth relation were transcendent, others might
b e so t oo. • • nl9He says that the anti-pragmatist weapons are only

tools of resistance for the pragmatist.

Truth is a relation for

James, but it is given as a changing relation between mind and
reality, and therefore 0tel•tive"to changing experience.
18 Page 1 of Thesis.
19 Meaning of Truth, Preface xiv

-

9 -

He took his position on the meaning of truth because he must
have realized that with a transcendental truth he would lose the
final value of his a posteriori stand on the good which satisfies,
£or the pragmatist, the demand that is there whether or not the
good exists prior to the demand.
Truth must be changeable as well as cumulative: "· •• truth
becomes a habit of certain of our ideas and beliefs in their inter20
vale of rest from their verifying activities."
The "truth-process
or discovery of truth, is a constant leaningtowards direct "veri21
fication" and," •••we have to live today by the truth we can get
22
today;" also, "We get at one truth only throU,~h the rest of truth;
and the reality, everlastingly postulated as that which all our
truth must keep in touch with, may never be given us save in the
'

2~

form of truth other than that which we are testing."
20

Pragp;!!!. tism, 222
The context compares truth to a quality like health. Since
health is what the scholastics call an °entitative" habit,
and subject to change, as betng part of a changeable disposition in the body, the pragmatic picture of truth becomes
clearer.
21 llli• 207 The context states that truth demands to be tested.
22 Ibid. 22~ See Footnote 12 on Page 4 of Thesis.
2~ ll..eaning of Truth, 214

-

10

-

The acceptance of the truth of a proposition is non permanent
so long as it rests upon a changing reality.

The temporary and

provisional nature of pragmatic truth is further explained in the
following qu9tation, \'lhich seems to say that truth cannot rest
an~there

permanently, as it is always tied to the process of ver-

ification:
"We live forwards, a Danish thinker2~s said, but we understand backwards.

The present sheds a backward

previous processes.

l~ht

on the world 1 s

They may have been truth-processes for the

actors in them.

They are not so for one who knows the later revelations of the story .n 25

24 Kierkegaard, Soren, as quoted by Hoffdin.g in the Journal of
Philosophy and Psychology, Vol. II, 85-92
25 Pragmatism, 22)-24
The context is taken from the chapter, "The Notion of Truth",
and underlines the modern insistence upon the idea that life
is basically changing, and to demand an unchanging element
is death. "Science analyzes life by killing it."Footnote l)b

-

11

The past nature of an experience would seem to rob it of
'truth, because

11

the trut.h of our mental operations must always

be an intra-experiential affair.

A conception is reckoned true

by common sense when it is made to lead to a. sensation<.

The

sensation, which for common sanae is not so much 'true' as

1

rea.l 1 ,

is held to be provisionally true by the philosopher just in so far
as it covers

••• a still more absolutely real experience."

"For objective realities are not

~'

26

at least not in the universe

of discourse to which we are now confining ourselves, for there they
27
are taken as simply being, while ideas are true~ them."
Here we
have the question raised as to whether James overlooks the ontological truth.
26

He has clearly conceived all truth as a changing

Essays in Radical Empiricism, New York:Longmans,Green,l912 202-'
The context is from the chapter entitled "The Essence of
Humanism," Part IV, which is a summarizing and explanatory note
in a setting of answers to ob~ections raised by opponents.
27 Meaning of Trut.h, 155 Ch. VI A Word More About Truth"

~

------------------------------------------------·
12 truths 1 as plural as the discrete reality

relation, a network of

1

in which they inhere.

The lack of any anchor pr unchanging value

or anything else of a secure nature is a basic aspect of pragmatism.
There is no room at all :f'or anything like ontological truth; James
sticks to a relative truth tied to experience constantly in mutation, and so there is no one truth for him, but a series of 1 truths 1 •
If James had been quite accurate in his terminology, he would never
have spoken of truth in the singular, since for him there was no
such thing in reality.
"Realities are not ~' they ~' and beliefs are true of them.•

28

It would appear here that truth has a strictly logical meaning, or is
imbedded only in knowledge, or rather in the materials of knowledge,
which are for James, ideas.

Truth cannot be called an equivalent

of reality, an «adequation of the mind to reality," as it is in the
scholastic scheme of things.

29

28 Meaning of Truth, 196
The context is in the chapter entitled: 11 The Pragmatist
Account of Truth and its Misunderatanders."
29 Aquinas, Thomas, gQ. de Veritate, Q. I, a. 1
"Oonvenientiem vero entia ad intellectum exprimit hoc nomen
verum ••• Hoc est ergo quod addit verum super ens, scilicet
conformitatem, sive adaequationem rei et intellectus; ad q~
conformitatem, ut dictum est, sequitur cognitio re1. 11

-

~Thereas,

1.? -

in scholasticism, truth is expressed as a relation

between mind and reality,

~we

must attribute the same truth to

reality and to knowledge of reality, or there is no relation left;
in pragmatism, where true things are only true temporarily,
there can be no ontological truth.

Truth for James is a quality,

and while he does indeed admit that truth of knowledge means that
mind and the thing known are related, this truth remains changeable,
on the one level. There is no higher point to which it may be
referred.

It hangs alone, and the mind may interpret reality

entirely as it chooses, without the norm of the ontological truth
of being.

~

Aquinas, Thomas, S.T. I Q.l6 a.l "Utrum ver~ta.s sit in re,
vel tantum in int;Ue'ctu."
Also, Q.16 a. 3 ad primum; "Dicendum quod verum est in rebus
et in intellectu ut dictum est. Verum autem quod est in rebus
convertitur cum ente secundum substantiam •. Sed verum quod est
in intellectu, convertitur cum ante, ut manif'estativum :: cUJh.-·
ma.nifestato. •

-

14 -

James cannot have understood that because he could dist~ish

mentally between the reality of things and their truth,

it does not follow immediately that there is no metaphysical truth
at all, that it is a category impressed upon unwilling reality.
Before we may exercise our human thought upon the universe, there
must already exist a real truth belonging to things themselves. If
the truth of things were not a relative propoerty of being as far
as the human mind is concerned, then reality would posses actual,
not potential ontological truth, and there would be no ground for
distinguishing between the being of things and their truth. The
concept of reality as being is one thing; it is prior to the second
concept of reality as true.
The pragmatist relies on psychology to supply his first principles
yet begins l-rhere the scholastic does, in being.

It is his appli-

cation of hie principles that leads him away, instead of into, the
subject and object of philosophy.

- 15 James took the rationalist definition of truth as an Absolute
prior to the concept of being in general and impressed upon it by
the mind; his definition made truth one of a thousand other units
of experienced philosophy.

These "truth-units" form a aeries of links

with reality, but are never permitted to leave it or transcend it.
If we ask whose idea of the Absolute in particular does James

attack, the answer is probably Kant's absolute.

He never tires of

attacking Kant's categorical imperative an.d his categories in

.

general as 11 arti:f'icial constructions."

'2

He seeks truth in 11 pure experience 11 : 11 Pure experience is the name I
give to the immediate flux of life which furndshes the material to
our later reflection with its conceptual categories.•'3ne insists
that nTruth does not lie in the direction of the Absolute," ••• "only
in so far as they lead us, successfully or unsuccessfully, back

into

sensible experience again, are our abstracts and universals true or
false at all. 11 74Finally,"Taken as it does appear, our universe is to
a large extent chaotic. No one single type of connection runs through
all the experiences that compose it."'5
52
55
54
55

Pragnatiam, 178
Essays in Radical Empiricism, 95
Ibid. 100 Context is on F.H.Brad+ey 1 s Absolute
Ibid. 46

-

16 -

There are a few other Absolutes that suffer burning at the stake
in James 1 s writings.

~6

He seems never to have dissociated the Ab-

solute antecedent to reality and the concept of the real truth that
follows from the real existence of things.

*

*

* * *

*

We may consider the pragmatic good as a twin of the pragmatic
truth.
fact.

The truth is one momentary realizn.tion of an experienced
It is part of a series carried on to no ending and in a

cumulative activity.

There is only a logical distinction in the

scholastic mind between the truth of a thing and its being. He
protests that we cannot know a thing without knowing also that it
is true.~7

It follows also that good and being may also be con-

vertible, since anything, in so far as it is, is good.

~8

,a

Essays in Radical Empiricism, Ch.XII - "Absolutism and Rela tivism1 This coversan attack on Hegelian monism.
Will to Believe, Ch.entitled "Is Life Worth Living?" The context attacks Leibnitz.
Pragmatism, "The One and the Ma.ny 1 , pp.l42 and 146
Context attacks Royce and Bradley.
Stmmlll Theologiae, I Q.XVI a. ~ ad tertium ,
Dieendum quod, cum dicitur quod ens non poteet apprehend! sine
ratione veri, hoc poteet dupliciter intellegi."
Ibid. I Q.V a.~ Reap.
Dieendum quod omne ens, inquantum est ens, est bonum.

17 In pragmatism, good has no foothold in being. "They good or bad
mean no absolute natures, independent of personal support. They
are objects of feeling and desire, which have no foothold or
anchorage in Being apart from the existence of actually living mindt.
Wherever such minds exist, '"ith judgments of good and ill,
and demands upon one another, there is an ethical world in all its
essential features.n~9
James has confused two kinds of good, in the quotation.
doing it deliberately, to keep his exaggerated a
a certain safe level.
of the Ka.ntian man.
11

He is

posterioris~

on

Also, he is attacking the categorical good
He is determined to avoid this last at any coat.

In its mere material capacity, a thing can no more be good 'or

bad than it can be pleasant or painful • • • Goodness, badness and
obligation must be realized somewhere in order really to exist.n4o
He concentrates on this realization of the appetite to the exclusion
of any other good. "We are asking whether goods and evils and obligation exist in physical facts ·per ee.

Surely there is no status

for good or evil to exist in, in a purely insentient world."
~9

4f

Will to Believe, 197 The context here gives a striking picture of
two human beings surviving alone to exist 'n a universe that has
shrunk to one rock. There is still an ethical universe so long as
these two live, James says. He seems to think that transcendentals
require space and immGnsity in which to exist.
4o Ibid. 190
41 Ibid. 190 The word 'insentient' seems to mean 1 inorganic 1 in
James. See p. 2~, Footnote 5, of thesis.

18 The point that James is making is lost unless we remember his
dislike of all absolutes, and hie denial of the view of reality
that may change and yet offer an unchanging truth.

For the prag-

matist there is never a chance to rest in the termination of
the operation.

The appetite never gains its end, nor does it

delight in a. good obtained for very long.

The scholastic takes

a. bonum sibi, the existing thing looked at as good in as much as

it.!!;

the bonum honestlliD. or the object which is good because it

is the perfecting of the appetite; and the bonum utile which is
good as a means, and is an instr'Uri.lent, for the attainrr:ent of an
end that is the real good.

42

The pragmatist denies all subjective good, the bonum sibi, and
the bonum honestum or objective good as well.
42

It is the outcome

Aquinas, Thomas, S.T. Q.5, a.6, Reap.
"· •• Sic ergo in motu appetitus, id quod est appetibile
terminans motum appetitus secundum quid, ut medium per quod
tenditur in aliud, vacatur utile. Id autem quod appetitur ad
ultimum, terminans totaliter medium motum appetitus, aicut qua.edam
res_ in qu.a.m per se appetitus tendit, vacatur honestum, quia
honeatum dicitur quod per se desideratur. Id autem quod terminat motum appetitus ut quies in res desiderata, est delecta.tio. n

Ill"'"

--------------------------------------------.
-

19 -

of an extreme degree of a posteriorism. In the important dictum:
"The essence of good is simply to satisfy a demand • • • "

4'which

has been quoted, it is evident that a pragmatic good does not exist
prior to the demand.

It answers a demand that is already there,

blindly seeking something to satisfY it, and the demand is as
stated, indifferent to which good satisfies it. .
Good, in pragmatism, does not exist as good until it has actually
been good, been realized in the satisfaction of a demand.

It follows

upon its acceptance as something good that anything satisfactory
is made to be good actually.

4' Will to Believe, 201 See also First Page of Thesis.
The context is taken from the·chapter, "The Moral Philosopher
and the Moral Life,• and is mostly a protest against all
absolutes;
"The various ideals have no common chc.racter apart from the
fact that they are ideals. No single abstract principle can
be so used as to yield to the philosopher anything like a
scientific~lly accurate and genuinely useful casuistic scale."

20

-

James :makes a double mistake about the character of the good.
He denies the existence of an ontological good and he misconceives
the relation good has to the demand of·a nature for it. There is
no criterion for him of truth or good outside the cha.Ming aspect
of things in reality.

Both truth and good

ar~

tied to his sort of

expediency.
11

Truth is one species of good,

a category • • • 11

44

and not 1 as is usually supposed,

The entire dictum on truth may be profitably

tkaen up here again, as the best expression of James's way of expressing his pragmatic principles:

•

"The true, to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the
way of our thuu{ing, just as
the \;ray of our behaving.

1

the right' is only the expedient in

Expedient

~

almost any fashion, and ex-

pedient in the long run and on the whole course; :f'or what meets
expediently all'the experience in sight won't necessarily meet all
further experience equally satis:f'actorily.

Experience, as we know,

has ways of boiling over, and making us convert our present :f'ormula.s. 11 1!;

44

Pragmatism, 80

45 l.lli,, 222 The italics are those of :,'filliam James.

-

21 -

This discussion on the nature o£ the pragmatic truth is a
necessary prelude to the further consideration of the· pragmatic
treatment of the universal moral law.

Once the pragmatist has

established his relative truth, then all 'rightness' of action
becomes relative as well.

If there is no truth in being, as a

part of its necessary structure, then it follows that all truths
are left without an anchor.
There remain to be considered the application of truth, in
the pragmatic law, and the moral law.

The meaning of the moral

law in James derives its fundamentals from the attributes of the
pragmatic truth as mutable, provisional, and cumulative.

* * • • * •

CHAFfER II
Relativism in the Moral Life

The problem of morality in the writings of William James
1

is complicated by his treatment of the will , his concept of
the individual as an experiencing aggregate,

2

and his treatment

of first principles as entirely of psychological origin.;
While these are treated in scholastic philosophy as part of a
philosophy of man, it is impossible to incorporate them substantially
in this thesis without spending much apace on James's psychology.
They are philosophical propositions treated psychologically by
James, and since he has kept them almost entirely _!!! his psychology, unless we commence a study of conditioned reflexes along
with the study of morality in James, we cannot treat of those items.
A complete study of morality in James would involve much mention
4
of a minimum of neurological anatomy, etc.
Principles of Psychology, Vol.II, Ch. 2Z, "The WillR
Ibid. Chapter 10, "The Passing Thought is the only Thinker
\ihich Psychology Requires."
; .!J?.!!!. Chapter 4, "Habit"
4 ~. Chapter ;, "On Some General Conditions of Brain Act.iyity."
Vol.II Chapter 2;, "The Production of ~wvement"
Chapter 24, "Instinct"

1
2

-

22

-
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To keep in the sphere of philosophy and away from the empirical
psychology of pragmatism, we must start our study of moral life
with a survey of the philosophy of activity, as distinct from
the psychological or physiological principles of production of
movement.
Activity must be considered as such before we can approach the
pragmatic definition of moral activity and the meaning of the word,
For a real beginning we take the postulate;"Nothing shall
be admitted as a fact ••• except what can be experienced at same
definite time by some experient; and for every feature of fact ever
so experienced, a definite place must be found somewhere in the
final system of reality.n4
The prtmitive stuff of our lives is not merely a process, a
"something going on115aome,there.

It 1a, for the pragmatist, also

a sense of change, a something going on in relation to the individual

4

Essays in Radical Empiricism,

5 Ibid. 161

160

"Now it is obvious that we are tempted to affirm activity
wherever we find anything going on. Taken in the broadest sense,
any apprehension of something doing, is an experience of activity •
1
1
• • • 0hange taking place
is a unique content of experience,
1
1
one of those conjunctive objects which radical empiricism
seeks so earnestly to rehabilitate and preserve. The sense of
activity is thus in the broadest and vaguest way synonymous with
the sense of 1 life 1 • We should feel our ~nn subjective life at
least, in noticing and proclaiming an otherwise inactive world."
(Note: Inactive, insentient and inorganic would seem to be equivalents. See p. 17, Footnote 41.)

- 24 having the e%perience.
and

ca~ot

Activity in the abstract is a dead thing,

very well be used in considering life and its processes,

except as one uses a skeleton to learn about a part of man.

The

pragmatic appeal is to something happening now, not in the past
or in the future.

6

Activity without an actor is not admissable to the universe
of pragmatism, for the actor is the first point of reference.
"Bare activity would thus be predicable, though there were no definits
direction, no actor, and no aim ••• But in this actual world of
ours, as it is given, at least a part of the activity comes with
definite direction; it comes with desire and sense of goal."7

6

Ibid. 160

-vsy the

principle of pure experience, either the word,
'activity' must have no meaning at all, or else the original
type and model of whs. t it means must lie in some concrete
kind of experience that can definitely be pointed out."
p. 162
"It seems to justify, or at any rate to explain, Mr. W- 1 s
expressions that we !£! only as we are active, for we !I!
only as experients."
p. 167
"The word •activity' has no imaginable content whatever
save these experiences of process."
7 ~· 162

-
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That sense of goal belongs to the single actor, the acting
individual.

He alone is responsible for hie actions and he

alone in the universe is acting.
to himself.

He alone measures the universe

for example, the story has already been cited, 8 in

which James pictures the universe shrunk to one rock on which there
remain two hunan beings.

"That rock would have as thoroushly

moral a constitution as any possible world which the eternities
and immensities would harbor. n9 James remai:ks that we are the inhabitants of that rock; whether a god exists or not, we form an
0
ethical universe} we rule our 0\'m actions alone, it seems to follo,.,.
The word, "moral, n in James, has almost as many meanings as it
has usages.

He has been quoted

11
as saying that wherever human

minds exist, there is an ethical world in its essential features.
8

Page 16 of Thesis, Footnote

9 Will to Believe, 197
10

..!lli·

;9

197 The context implies that our actions are subject only
to our own minds; we have no direct contact with anything else
but experience, therefore nothing else can be a reference of
action.
11 Page 16 of Thesis, Footnote ;9

- 26 In the same context, he uses the word, "moral," as being

equivalent to "ethical"; examples occur in the book, The \'l..ill
to Believe, in the chapter entitled "The l4oral Philosopher and the

~~ral Life," whdch offers an examination of ethical philosophy. 12
Another use of

th~

word, •moral", occurs in another context.

Here James has assumed the role of a teacher discussing the forme.tion of habits.

Good habits, he says, are useful action, but

bad habits are not only not useful, but harmful to the one ovr.ning
them.

l~

In the same place, J.S. Mill is quoted as saying that a

perfect character is a completely trained will.

He~e

it would seem

"moral" has been limited to the sense of being"rooted in the will." 14
12 See Chapter III of Thesis, pp.40,4l
1~ Talks on Psychology and Lire's Ideals, Chapter 8,p.70

p.64

The context is taken from the chapter,"Laws of Habit", in the
division called, 11 Ma.xims for Habit-Forming", and is directed toward
explaining in non-psychological language theories of habit formmation, or automatic tendencies to act 1n a certain way. "All our
life, so far as it has definite form, is but a mass of habits,
-practical, emotional, intellectual, - systematically organized
for our weal or \'foe, and bearing us irresistibly toward our
destiny, whatever the latter tmy be. n
14 Quoted on p. 70 of Talks on Psychologt:
"A 1 character 1 ,as J.S. Mill says, is a completely fashioned
will."

-
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Again, in his psychology, the word, "moral", appears in
James's writings in the connection of habit with moral principles.
1

Moral principles are quite incongruent with the order of
nature;
The moral principles which our mental structures engender
are quite as little explicable in toto by habitual experiences
having bred inner cohesions. Rightness is not ~ usualness,
wrongness not~ oddity, however numerous the~cts which
might be invoked to prove such identity. Nor are the moral
judgments those most invariably and emphatically impressed
on us by public opinion. The most characteristic and peculiarly
moral judgments that a man is called on to make are in tmprecedented oases and lonely emergencies where no popular
rhetorical maxim can prevail, and the hidden oracle alone can
speak; and it speaks quite often in favor of conduct quite
unusual and suicidal as far as gaining popular approbation goes." 15
There no development elsewhere in James that really explains the
terms he uses or the propositions set up in the quoted paragraph
above.

A further citation from James is offered, however,

to illustrate his use of "moral" as referring to ethics, and
yet with its psychological meaning as applied to a movement of
the will.

15 Principles of Psychologr, Vol.II, 672

-
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"Every now and then someone is born with a right to be ortginal,
and his revolutionary thought or action may bring prosperous
fruit.

He may replace old 'laws of ~ture' by better ones, he

may, by breaking old moral rules in a certain place, bring in
a total condition of things more ideal, than would have followed
16
had the rules been kept.n
The immense importance of this lonely revolutionary in the
pragmatic world is an example of its unitary notion of activity.
If there is any wider activity than that of the single actor, "the
question of how far it is successfully exerted can be answered
only by investigating the details of fact."l7
16 Will to Believe, 208
17 Essays in Radical Empiricism, 180
The context remarks, on p. 178, that we like to believe
that activities of both a wider and a narrower span are at
work together in reality, that the long-span tendencies
yoke the others in their service; but that it is a problem
how to represent the modus operandi of such steering of
small tendencies by large ones.

- 29 The problem raised by the pragmatist cannot be answered
entirely on his level. We must discuss the scholastic Absolute
and consider the quarrel of James with all absolutes, commenced
in Chapter I of this thesis.
For the pragmatist, it is the individual alone who is considered
I

in our pluralistic universe of chaotic units.

The nature of this

single actor is as pluralistic as is his universe. Hie will is
"an aggregate of tendencies to act in a fi~·and prompt and
definite way in all the principal emergencies of life." 18 In
In his quarrel with the scholastic definition of the powers of
the soul, James says:
"There is something grotesque and unnatural in the supposition
that the soul is equipped with elementary powers· of such an
ingeniously intricate sort • • • Evidently the faculty does not
exist absolutely, but operates under conditions."l9

19

Talks on Psychology and Life's Ideals, 70
Context is on the formation of good and bad habits.
(Page 26 of Thesis.)
Principles of Psychology, Vol.I, p.~

,0

-

In the quotation just given, James was thinking of the memory,
and denying to it any absolute character.

Perhaps this is because

one experience may not be substituted for another, in a system of
experiences: 20
"The only function that one experience can perform is to
lead to another experience; and the only fulfilment we can
apeak of is the reaching of a certain experienced end. \'lhen
one experience leads to (or can lead to) the same end as
another, the agree in function. But the whole system of experiences as they are immediately given presents itself as a
quasi-chaos through which one can pass out of an initial term
in mny directions and yet end in the same terminus, moving from
next to next by a great many possible paths.n21
So we have the pragmatic man, with a will strictly pluralistic,
in movement toward a reality that offers a chain of experiences.

"To begin with, how

~

things so insecure as the successfUl

appearances of this world afford a stable anchorage?

A chain is

no stronger than its weakest link, and life is after all a chain. 022
20

See page 19 of Thesis; this is an echo of the dictum on the
good as anything that satisfies a demand; finality in activity
seems to be left out.
21 Essays in Radical Empiricism, 6;
The context is from the chapter,"A World of Pure Experience."
22 Varieties of Religious Experience, 1;6

-
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The rule of action in the world of experience is imbedded in
empirical facts.

1

Life is one long struggle between conclusions

based on abstract ways of conceiving cases, and opposite conclusions
2
prompted by our instinctive perception of them as individual facts." '
2
This and other pragmatic problems tead us into the study of pragma.tic law.
James says that scientific laws are gained by disregarding the
chaos of conditions present in the universe: "The principle of unitrormity of nature is of this sort; it has to be sought under and in
spite of the most rebellious appearances; and our conviction of its
truth is far more like a religious faith than like assent to its
25
demonstrations."
23 Principles of Psychology, Vol. II, 674
The context is .from the chapter, "Aesthetic and Moral
Principles", in which the man of instinct is praised as being
more true to his nature tba.n the man who can spin out e.
lengthy commentary on ideals ways of' acting.
24 Page 3 of' Thesis, .footnote 7 and Page I of' Thesis.
The dictum on the pragmatic truth raises the problem of the law.
25 Principles of' Psychology, Vol. II, 636-37

It ie increasingly evident in this Chapter II that the only
answer to the pragmatic rule of action is the admiesion of an
26
Eternal Lawgiver, whose attributes help to bring order into the
world of Being.

If we have only the chaotic unverse with no single

pattern running through it, then we have no reason at all. But James
says that there is an intellect in the universe that must be considered - man 1 s.

"Visible nature is all plasticity and indifference,
27

- a moral multiverse, as one might call it.·:and not a_ moral universe.•
In another book. James says: "The pursuit of ends and choice are
the marks of Mind 1 s presence.•28 The pragmatist recognizes only one
intellect in the universe, and that is man's.

This single activity

is not visibly dependent upon activities of a "wider span."

29

Whatever destiny the pragmatic man may have, it does not influence
his momentary deqision or his immediate actians.}O
26 See Conclusions of Thesis for Eternal Law.
27 Will to Believe, 4~,44
28 Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, in Chapter,"The Scope of
Psychology. 11
29 Page 28 of Thesis, Footnote 17
;o Page 15 of Thesis, Footnote ~5

-
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James attacks the rationalist absolute, that o£ one Heinrich
~1

Rickert;

in a chapter concerned with truth primarily, but also

protesting against absolutes as regulating laws.
"They ~beolute principle!} are his ~e rationalist'~ evidence
merely, they are no part of the life of truth ittel£.

That life

transacts itself in a purely local or epistemological, as distino~ished

£rom a psychological, dimension, and its claims antedate

and exceed all personal motivations whatsoever.•~

2

The point is quite true i£ applied to such an absolute as the
transcendental idealists give us·.

A friend of James, Josiah Royce,

may also have been partly responsible £or the dictum on the life
o£ truth.~~
~1

~2
~~

Mentioned in Pragmatism, 2~2, Footnote. In an article by Kurt
·Leidecker in D. Runes' Dictionary o£ Philosophy, Rickert is
called a f'ollo'"er o£ Fichte and a transcendental idealist.
P.ragmati~, 228
From the chapter,"The Notion o£ Truth."
Article on Josiah Royce, calling htm a neo-Hegelian, in Runes
Dictionary of Philosophy. This article is most unf'air, as the
deeply religious Royce was really a sort o£ pantheist. At least,
he bears t.he marks o£ Spinoza 1 s search f'or God, rather than the
Hegelian absolute.

~4

-

A formula for law in William James is rather hard to find
from his

~xtant

writings.

First of all, law seems to have as

changing an aspect as the relative truth:

II

1.1
,l
••• their Laws_:]

great use is to summarize old facts and lead to new ones. They
are only a man-made language, a conceptual shorthand, as someone
calls them, in which we write our reports of nature; and languages, as is well known, tolerate much choice of expression and
many dialects. 11 ;4
\1.hile law in the moral world is not meant here, but the laws of
nature, James sees all law in the aame distasteful

com~

as the

absolutes:
"Common-law judges sometimes talk about the law, and schoolmasters
talk about the latin tongue, in a "rtay to make their hearers think

they mean entities pre-existent to the decisions or to the words
and syntax, determining them unequivocally and requiring them to
obey • •• u~,~t;
.....

;4 Pragmatism, 57
Ibid. 240-41 The context is from the chapter,"Pragmtism
and Humanism. n

~5

;5 As far as conduct is concerned, James sweeps away any possible
moral law:

"Distinctions between the lawful and the unlawful in

conduct, or between the correct and incorrect in speech, have grown
up incidentally among the interactions of men's experience in detail;
and in no other way do distinctions between the true and the false
in

belief ever grow up ••• •;6

James also charges that we set up an Almighty and read our thoughts
into His mind; we see Him thinking in conic sections and syllogisms,
and our laws are ours, not His.

These complaints are quite fair.

God does not go about His business with the same sort of tools He
has given his creature, man: ;7
"When the first laws were discovered, men were so carried away
by the cleanness, beauty and simplification that resulted, that
they believed themselves to have deciphered the eternal thoughts
of the Almighty. He made Kepler's laws for the planets to follow,
and when we rediscover any one of these, his wondrous institutions,
we seize his mind in its very literal intention.
But as the sciences have developed farther, the notion has
gained ground that :3~t, perhaps all, of our laws are only
approximations ••• "

;6 Pragmatism, 241
;7 Pragmatism, 56 Ohapter, "\'lhat Pragmatism Means•
;8 1l?,g. 56,57

- 36
Law in general, is,
his pragmatic truth.

~or

James, a sort of application of

Indeed, it would appear that the relative

truth of Chapter I of this thesis
meaning whatsoever.

I~

w~uld

rob law of any stable

there is no real truth to rule on,

no truth that does not change and can be applied in a law, then
no law stands, whether it be natural or moral.
The application of the relative truth means also a relative
law.

There is only one "truthme.ker" in the tmiverse, and that

is man himself.

It

~ollows

that his law will be also a reflection

of his temporary truth, and another expression of utilitarian
individualism.

• • * •

CHAPrER III
~~ral

Activity and the Actor

The landscape of pragmatic citations provides, in the
previous chapters, the background of the specific point in
question, the place of the moral law in pragmatism. There are no
first principles taken absolutely,in the moral order, in James:
"Since everything which is demanded is by that fact a good, must
not the guiding principle for ethical philosophers (since all
demands cannot conjointly be satisfied in this poor world) be simply
to satisfy at all times as many demands as we can!"

1

"So far as the casuistic question goes, ethical science is just
like physical science, and instead of being deducible all at once
from abstract principles, must simply bide its time and be ready
to revise its conclusions day by day."

2

With a good that is relative

to a changing demand?and a relative truth which cannot be applied
by any single law, we have no finality in ethics.
1 Will to Believe, 205
2 .!1?.!!. 208
? Page 19 of Thesis.

"The

¥~ral

Philosopher and the Moral Universe"

-

~8

The finishing touch is given

b~

-

James in a context in which he

says that since metaphysics and theology, which provide the primary
postulates for ethics, are also in a state of flux: " The chief
of all reasons which concrete ethics cannot be final is that
they

[si~J

wait upon metaphysical and theological beliefs .n 4

I£ there is no finality in ethics, then there are no universal
laws for human action.

In Chapter I of this thesis, truth

liaS

shown to be quite unitary, measured by the individual to his own
need and desire.
ends.

He alone is the one who establishes his end, or

There can be no universal destination for all humans in the

pragmatic universe, and no universal moral law regulating them
toward that end.5

4

Will to Believe, 210
The context is someidJa.t like the one from Descartes 'Method:
"0£ Philosopb1 I will say nothing, save that when I saw that
it had been cultivated for many ages by the most distinguished
men, and that yet there is not a single matter within its sphere
which is not still in dispute, and nothing, therefore, which is
above doubt, I did not presume to anticipate that my success
would be greater in it that that of others • • • As to the other
Sciences, inasmuch as these borrow their principles from
Philosophy, I judged that no solid superstructure could be
raised on foundations so infirm."
(Tr.Veitch, Chicago:Open Court,l899 page 8)
5 See Page 26 of Thesis, footnote 1~

~9

There

mus~

be some sort of rule by which

make his decisions.

good.

exis~

mus~

may
be a

James has taken his moral rule from the

He refuses

as such, and says

~he pragmatis~

Even with a relative good, there

judgment of some kind.
rela~ive

-

~

see good or evil in physical facts

there is no room for goods and evils ~o
6
in, in an insen~ien~ world.
"How can one physical fact be
tha~

considered simply as a physical fact, be

1

bet~r

1

than another?

Betterness is not a physical relation."7
If we consider the pragmatic picture of moral activity by
a free agent, man, who is his own moral universe, and forget
about the several meanings of good8, then James is quite right.

6 Will to Believe, 190
Page 17 of Thesis
7 Ibid. 190
8 Page 18 of Thesis, Footnote 42

- 4o

The furthering of the pragmatic rule is attempted in this
quotation :from "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life 11 :
"Imagine an absolutely material world, contatn~ only
physical and chemical facts, and existing from eternity without
a God, without even an interested spectator. ':lould there be any
sense in saying of that world that one of its states is better
than another? Or if there were two such worlds possible, \vould
there· be any rhyme or reason in calling one good and the other
bad? Good or bad positively, I mean, and apart from the :fact
that one might relate itself better than the other to the philosopher's private interests."9
Just what is gained by taking such e. stand is really a
mystery that remains in the mind of William James.

If' we are

to apply hie pragmatic rule to his remarks, then we can answer
that since no such world or. worlds exist, or can exist, then
there is no possible application of them in a philosophy of
pure experience.

9 Will to Believe, 187
Also, Aquinas, Thomas, from the De Veritate, Q.I,a.l
11
Si omnia intellectus (quod est impossibile) intelligeretur
auferri, nullo modo ratio veritatis remaneret. 0

r
- 41
After his confusion regarding the various kinds of goods,
James takes the attitude t:Qat to assume an abstract good or
bad is to assume an abstract zero:
nGoodneas, badness and obligation must be realized somewhere
in order to exist, and the first step in ethical philosophy
is to see that no merely inorganic 'nature of things' can realize
them. Neither moral relations nor the moral law can Sl'ling in vacuo.
Their only habitat can be a mind which feels them; and no world
composed of purely physics.! facts can possibly be a world to
which ethical propositions apply." 10
There must be some individual to make a demand before anything
is good, and in the universe only those individuals can seek
a goal, according to James.

Certainly he is right to say that

the moral law cannot swing in vacuo.
his system.

It doesn't, except in

The nature of good and evil should provide a setting

for moral activity, and when good is purely relative, then we have
relative morality.

10 Will to

B~lieve,

190

-
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The word, "sentient" , seems to be equivalent to "living" ;
as James says that mind is shown to be present by the presence
of ends and choice, so even in a pragmatic world, only a living
thing with mentality could desire anything.

The position of

the single moral being becomes clearer:
"The moment one sentient being, however, is made part of the
universe, there is a claim for goods and evils to exist, really.
Moral relations now have their status, in that being's consciousness. So far as he feels anything to be good, he makes
it good. It 1! good, for htm,is absolutely good, for he is the
sole creator of values in that universe, and outside of his
opinion things have no moral character at all. In such a universe
as that it would be absurd to raise the question of whether the
solitary thinker's judgment is good or ill, or true or not. Truth
supposes a standard outside the thinker to which he must conform;
but herit the thinker is a sort of divinity, subject to no higher
judge. 11
The difference to reality of the introduction of a •sentient"
being is not very clear.

Nature is not regarded as the work of

intelligence, in the pragmatic system.

Man apparently is not

to be accounted for by introducing a Creator.

\fuat sort of relation

man has to nature is hard to see, and his relation to his fellow
man is something quite incomprehensible.

11

Will to Believe, 190

- 4;Jamea considers his single actor in the universe as the
one kind of intelligence needed in the picture:
"Let us call the supposed universe which he inhabits a
moral solitude. In such a moral solitude it is clear that
there can be no outside obligation, and that the only trouble
the god-like thinker is liable to have will be over the considering of his own several ideals with one another. Some of
these will no doubt be more pungent and appealing than the·
rest, their goodness will have a profounder, more penetrating
taste; they will return to haunt htm with more obstinate regrets if violated. So the thinker will have to order his life
to them as its chief determinants, or else remain im1ardly
discontented and unhappy. Into. whatever equilibrium he may settle,
though, however he may straighten out his system, it will be a
right system. For beyond the facts of his own subjectivity
there is nothing moral in the world." 12
The context continues with the introduction of another solitary
thinker into the universe which had but one.

There are two

possibilities, James says, in the ethical situation.

i'/e have

twice as much of the ethical quality as before, but no ethical
unity.

Each of the two thinkers may

at his own pace.

~ore

the other and proceed

We have a moral dualism, and a thing may be

good for one and bad for the other, with equal truth in the
two judgments. 1;
12 Will to Believe, 191
1) ~- 191,2

-
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If we continue to add solitary thinkers to our universe:
"Multiply the thinkers into a pluralism, and we find realized
for us in the ethical sphere something like the world which the
antique skeptics conceived of - in which the individual minds
are the measures of all things, and in 'rthich no one 1 objecti!~
truth' but a multitude of subjective opinions can be found."
Existing reality and the social order force James to admit that
no one really does live entirely to himself'.

There is something

called "obligation" which arises in all systems, even that of
the pragmatist, in spite of the unitary measure of all things
taken as man.

We are jostled by conflicting realities, and diff-

erent claims are made on us.

James answers: "Invent some manner of

own

realizing your/ideala which will also satisfY the alien demands that and that only is the path of peace!" l5 Also,

0

those ideals

must be written highest which prevail at the least cost.nl6

14
15
16

Will to Believe, 192

.!!2.!i·
.!.!2i4.

205
205

- 45 Obligation

~or

the pragmatist does not reside in any absolute

right or a prior claim:
"Since the outcome o~ the discussion so far has been to
show that nothing can be good or right except so far as
sooe consciousness ~eels it to be right, we perceive on the
very threshold that the real superiority and authority which
is postulated by the philosopher to reside in some of the
opinions which he supposes must belong to others, cannot be
explained·-i>y •DF-abstraet moral 1nature of things 1 existing
antecedently to the thinkers themselves and their ideals. Like
the positive attributes, good and bad, the comparative ones,
better and worse, must be realized in order to be real.u17
The final word is well summed up in this sentence: "If one
ideal judgment be objectively better than another, that betterness
must be made flesh by being lodged concretely in someone 1 s actual
18
~
perception. 11
If we grant there is no other intellect in the
universe than the human mind, and that there is no superior
power in human lives, then we do indeed have a pragJpa.tic universe.

17 Will to Believe, 192-5
18 Ibid. 195

i·

-
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In our universe of moral solitudes, we have the picture
of a pattern of equal demands. There is no ruler in that world.
"If one of the thinkers were obviously divine, wpile all
the rest were human, there would probably be no practical
dispute about the matter. The divine thought would be
the order, to which the others should conform. But still
the theoretical questf~ remains, What is the good of obligation, even heret"
If we recall the obviously divine gods of the Greeks, 20to
whom homage was paid through f'ear, we may understand the question.
The pragmatist does not consider a Creator, and it follows that
man's obligation to man cannot exist unless first the obligation
to hie God is understood.
Since the cora of pragmatic ethics is the pragmatic truth and
the relative good, and each individual has his own law, any over
all unity in the moral order is impossible.

There is no moral

19 Will to Believe, 19'
20 Aeneidoa,L.I ~. Vergilius ¥aronis, Excursus I - De ministerio
deorum, imprimis Iunanis, in Aeneide
Heyne, ed.
London: Black and Young,l8'2

r

order, but a moral disorder.

The universality of law stems
21
from its very nature, not alone from the lawgiver. If' each
has his own law, we have a :multitude
pattern of relationships.
corpus.

of

values, and no clear

We have an aggregate. but not a

The contrast with the integrated humanism of another

point of view is very evident.

If we are to live together in

human accord, then each must bring hie share to the organism we
call society; no man can consider himself able to live alone,
in the moral sense.

He is never

~·~part

from them in the matter

of morals. The chaos of values that results from a multiplicity
of moral laws means disaster for man and his society.

21 Aquinas, Thomas, S.T. Ia-IIaeQ.lOO a.4 Reap. "--Et sic
ex quatuor praedictiS poteet colligi definitio legis,
quae nihil est aliud quam quaedam rati9nis ordinatio ad
bonum commune, ab eo qui curam conmrunita.tis habet, promulgata. n
The pragmatic attitude toward law is well presented in a book
called Mr. Justice Holmes, edited by Feliz Frankfurter. Holmes
remarks that handling actual issues instead of resting on formula
meant the difference between lif'e and death. Benjamin Oardozo
quotes the exact phrase on p.2.). John Dewey writes on "Justice
Holmes- and the Liveral Mind, 11 and quotes him as saying ~t the
Constitution is an expertment,as all life is an experi=ant. In
Frankfurter's article, the Supreme Oourt Justice says that law is
less important than he who interprets it.

r
-~-

The pragmatic man is never sure of his footing
in his slippery universe.
daily life.

He is forever a stranger in his

He bas nothing to hold himself erect by, and so

must proceed to grasp at expediencies, the lmtest of the
crutches men may use to provide a framework for their moral
judgments.

Man is robbed of his full humanity in a pragmatic

world, for if he really believee that all law is merely a
changing set of arbitrary rules, then anyone who is strong
enough can impose any law and be obeyed.

There will never be

an appeal to a higher justice than that of might making right.

• * * • • •
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CONCLUSIONS:

We have given the scholastic definition of law on page 47.
The background for all law lies in the realization of an
Absolute Being who is the Exemplar1 of creation, in \'those
Ydnd all things are 2 , and who, because He is Truth and Good
and does not participate in those attriButes as mere derived
qualities, must be the first measure of these values in this
world of created things.;

In his quarrel with the consideration of such a being, James
remarks in a famous passage,4that God's metaphysical attributes
have no intelligible (practical) significance, and his lists
these attributes, ending with the complaint that we have a
11

'

metaphysicM. monster" who doesn 1 t make much difference in the

universe, practically speaking.
1 Aquinas, Thomas, S.T •. I Q.l5,a.l.Reap. "Quia igitur mundus
non eat casu factus, sed est factus a Deo per intellectum
agentem ••• necesae est quod in mente divina sit forma ••• "
2 In Libr. Sent,, Dist. ;6, ~.I,a.; St. Thomas explains that
created things exist ~ simpliciter, but in a manner of
speaking; it is in God 1 a knowledge they exist, and are maintained in being.
; Summa Theologiae I Q.I, a.;, and in Ia-IIaeQ.~l a.l, and Q.9; a.;
Here St. Thomas remarks that God, fro~ His metaphysical attributes,
is the only possible being that measures the universe and gives
it and all in it a share in Truth and Goodness, and He alone can
permit the application of these in Law.
4 Varieties of Religious Experience, 445-46

-
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On the contrary, this 'metaphysical monster 1 5ma.kes a great

deal of difference in the ethical world.

There is also an

actual difference, 1n our world of everyday experience. The
aseitas does not have the compelling quality exhibited by the
manifestation of the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity; it
was never intended to supplant Him.

James decries the met-

aphysical attributes of God as being unusable in ethics, and
turns to the so-called moral attributes, those derived from
Revelation, with pleasure.9
Without an eternal law, our daily life would be unlivable. The
universe cannot be intelligible without the Eternal

La.l'l

behind

it, and n:e.n without his small reflection of that Law, could not
exist.

Nor can he be considered in his true value, without it.

5 Ibid. 446
6 Ibid. 447
In saying here that the moral attributes of God are valuable
because they invoke fear and love in man, James has forgotten to put the rational part of man above his rational
appetite, in its proper place.

51
Therefore, in opposition to the dictum that permits each
man to live under his own law, we present the necessity for there
being a Divtne Law that is absolute, from the nature of the Being
Whose Existence is His Law7, and this Being as Creator has given
His creature, man., a natural law; 8 and since He gave Il!1.n a share
in His existence, in a qualified way, since Being most properly
belongs first to God, then He

mus~

also have given his creature

some of the other a tt.ributes of His existence. For, as St. Thomas
9
says, whatever shares in the nature of a rule or measure is also
ruled or measured itself.

Therefore, all that are subject to God

are measured both by Divine Law and by the law of their ot-m being,
in a lesser way, since their very being would have no meaning

unless it followed in some way the Being of God, the First Cause.

7 S.T. ra-IIa8 Q.91 a,l ad tertium
8 S.T. ra-rraeQ.91 a.2 Respondeo
9 .I!t!4,.

r

- 52 Man, as the creature of God, follows the law he was given
upon the gift. of existence.

His ratio of action means the exer-

cising of activity through t.he

la'fTS

of his nature.

11

Unde patet

quod lex naturalis nihil aliud est quam participatio legis eternae
in ra tioni creatura. n10
It is also a result of these premisses that the natural law is
universal and one for all men.

Each man is only part of a pattern

which depends upon the Eternal Law.

11

Sic igitur dicendum est

quod lex naturae quantum ad prima principia, est eadem apud omnes
et secundum rectitudinem et secundum notitiam." 11

It is not through

man's will, as adhering to the outer things of experience, but
through his intellect, that the man operates as a truly human being.
The pragmatic failure is in misconceiving both philoso~ and an
important part of it: the psychology of humanity. It is true that
moral action is only possible when man can reco,gnize a moral
command through his intellect; there can be no primary measure in
the things of man 1 s experience as related to hie will in action.

• • •
10 S.T.±«-Irae Q.91 a.2.corpus
11 ]lli.
Q.94 a.4
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